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PREFACE
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the
Apostle Paul's doctrine of justification is not an
arbitrary replacement of the Jewish idea of justice
but a natural necessity of man's nature and his society.
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CHAPTER I
IN'I'nODUG'llION
Importance of: Thesis
This thesis is important becau.se it demonstrates
hoVl reason confirms faith in the case of one of the most
fundamental doctrines of Christianity--justification by
grace--the understanding of which is essential to satis-
factory adjustment to man's envirorunent and his aspira-
tions for eternal life.
Statement of 'l'hesis
We v'lillattempt to show that Paul's doctrine of
justification was not an arbitrary replacement of the
Jewish idea of justice but a natural necessity of'man's
nature and his society.
Support of Thesis
We will support this thesis in the following
manner:
1. A study of'Greek ethics which was based
on reason or the nature of man.
2. The impossibility thus revealed of met-
ing out justice by any law.
1
23. The necessary replacement of justice
among men by equity administered by a just judge.
We will argue that Paul's justification grows
out of this situation. He was meeting a great ethical
problem, a great religious problem, and a great social
problem. For if justice is equality 8mon8 equals, how
could we expect justice between an infinite God and a
finite man? and, if justice cannot be ministered by
law, how then is society to be preserved? We will at-
tempt to show that there is no justice here or hereafter.
There is no justice on earth, but there is equity_
There is no justice in the Kingdom of God, but there
1s justification. The former will be demonstrated by
a study of Aristotle, the world's first systematic
writer on justice. The latter will be demonstrated
by a study of Paul's doctrine of justification which
will show that grace, not justice, reigns in the King-
dom of God.
In arguing that Paul's doctrine of justifica-
tion by grace through faith follows from the necessi-
ties of human nature, we by no means either contradict
the Scriptures or replace their authority with a ration-
al system of thought. For, in the first place, we are
showing merely that the great Apostle's superlative
truth, which crone to him by revelation in Christl was
lGal. 1: 12.
3fully in accord with God's teaching that man is a ra-
tional being, created after God's own spiritual image
and in his likeness.l Its acceptance by the Apostle
himself, by early Christians, and by a whole host of
later, keeruninded theologians, among them some of the
greatest scholars of the world, testifies that this
apparently paradoxical teaching rests finally upon the
reason imbedded in man's nature.
Secondly, we feel free to appeal to man's own
nature for light on religious truths by the authority
both of the Church Fathers and the Holy Scriptures.
Justin Martyr appealed to the common sense of man in
his arguments regarding God the Father.l Theophilus
of Antioch in his apologies of Christianity "shows
great familiarity with Greek classics, and his writings
are frequently resorted to by critics of the classical
Greek texts on account of their richness in citations.,,2
In Clement "we see a man of a profoundly speculative
mind, with a high appreciation for the true, the beau-
tiful, and the good, wherever he might meet them, who
attempted to form a harmonious system of Christianity
in relation to the universe,,;3 and Origen "was the
lA. H. Newman , A Manual of Church History,
(Philadelphia: The American Baptist Publication Society;
1933) Vol. 1, p. 244. The author quotes from Justin
Martyr's Dial. v'li th Tr., Chap. 56.
2' 3Ibid., p. 246. Ibid., p. 274.
4first to study the Bible scientifically and critically."l
The Apologists "appealed to philosophy in their efforts
to defend the faith against the heathen as well as against
the fantastic interpretations of Gnosticism. Christianity
was, for them, both philosophy and revelation; its truths
were of supernatural origin and absolutely certain, but
"2they were rational truths •••• In addition to these,
we call attention to the fact that both Augustine and
'l'homasAquinas used reason to SUbstantiate their views
wherever it was possible.3
The Bible itself clearly speaks of two coven-
ants; the first written upon tablets and transferred to
parchment later.4 But the second covenant, denominated
a better one~ God wrote upon the minds and hearts of
men.6 Paul agrees with this mode of revelation to men
by God when he says that divine laws are "written in
their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness,
and their reasonings •••• 117 As it is the same God who
does not contradict himself, who has revealed his will
in these two ways, a correct study of the one must of
necessity confirm the other.
lIbid., p. 282.
2Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1936) p. 140.
3Ibid., pp. 148, 192.
4R• W. Moss, "Covenant," Dictionary of The Bible"
ed. James Hastings, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909)
5 6' 7Heb. 8: 7. Heb. 8: 10. Rom. ~: 15.
5Our thesis, therefore, rightly estimated, is a
confi~mation of God's written law of justification by
grace through faith; and not only does it thus confirm
it, but our study also renders this great Christian doc-
trine, in some ways so repugnant to common minds by its
demand for vicarious atonement, not only possible and
merciful, but necessary and indispensable to men as
they are now constituted. In other words, if men them-
selves, using all the reason they can command in this
service, give due reflection to the total situation,
they, even if they are not able by their own powers to
discover this truth, will give full consent to its sur-
prising reasonableness. In it there is no foundation
for calling it capricious; nor, since justice is here
impossible, can it be called unfair. It is the expression
and manifestation of that divine Love which finds a way,
and the only way, to offer redemption to men constituted
as they are.
An immediate conclusion that follows from this
rational and revealed view of righteousness is the ex-
planation for the absence of justice in the wor-Ld , 'l.lhat
absence, so persistently sought and so vainly deplored,
hardly needs more than a mention. Both moral and reli-
gious teachers of all ages have mourned not only the in-
justices visited by strong nations upon weak neighbors,
6not only unequal burdens laid upon the poor and lowly
in society and sanctioned by might, by custom, by law
and even by religion, but also those sometimes tragic
special acts of securing vineyards by murder and theft.
So tragically unequal have been the merits and demerits
on earth, that faithful men, like Kant, have perforce
been compelled to postulate another world in which such
uncorrected inequalities will be newly adjudicated.
1'his classis argument .for a hereafter has attained the
name of lithe jurdicel argument."
Nor has the establisrunent of the Church on earth,
with its promise and purpose of bringing the Kingdom of
God brought vlith it any great, abiding or visible rev-
olution in meting out justice. The reason for this
apparently paradoxical situation will be fully developed
in the later pages of this thesis. The absence of
justice from the Reign of God and the presence of mercy
unfathomed will be fully justified on rational grounds.
From such a study a radical change of attitude toward
all human r-e.LatLcnahd.ps should come , In place of carping
criticisTI1,in place of discouragement for the slow advance
of fair dealing among men, in place of hopeless doctr~n0s
of'human depravity, men may through this study, take
renewed hope and kinder sentiments toward their fellows,
7and, while still holding to the Ideal Justice as Equal-
ity among Equals, and while aiding all efforts to achieve
that perfect condition, they may with good hee.rt sub-
stitute the kindness of equity where they know that
justice cannot, in the nature of the case, be accomplished.
Our thesis, therefore, has its own ethical value, its own
moral gospel.
With the new light coming from our study of
justice we will give careful consideration to the Chris-
tian doctrine of justification by faith, so ardently
preached and supported by Paul. To this careful legal-
ist steeped in the Law that he kept with perfect punc-
tiliousness}to the Pharisee who meticulously tithed
his mint, and anise and cununin, and left undone the
'weightier matters of the law, justice, and mercy and
faith,2 the discovery came with transforming power that
between the infinite God and finite man justice could
never reign. In that flash of revelation3 the whoLe
Christian system was illumined from center to circum-
ference. The radiations of its light went out to every
corner of the world. In the place of the Law stood the
Christ; in the place of the judgment seat, stood the
Cross; in the place of penalty, came pardon; in short,
in the place of Justice came justification freely be-
stowed by an Infinite God upon a finite sinner. This
1Phil., 3: 13. 2Matt• 23: 23. 3Gal. 1: 12.
8immeasurable mercy, so contrary to all earthly stand-
ards of right, once revealed, pleaded with Paul's rea-
son and to the rational nature of millions in the ages
to come, so that this Gospel bids fair to cover the
earth as the waters cover the sea. To aid it in its
beneficent reign, to extend its merciful features, and
to do this by appeals to reason, though the means seem
small before the stupendous purpose, is another aim of
this thesis.
CHAPTER II
WHAT IS JUSTICE
Ethics in General
Bef'ore taking up a study of'Aristotle and his
ethics it might be well f'orus to take a glance at ethics
in general. The word t eth:i.cs'is derived from the Greek
ry8LI\O'S, that which pertains to ryeos, character. In its
widest sense the term would imply an examination into the
general character or habits of'mankind. In a narrower
sense it is concerned with such questions as each indi-
vidual man who wishes to act rightly is constantly calilied
upon to answer. It is the science of human conduct, the
"systematic study of the ultimate problems of human con-
duct."l It is recognized as one of the three fundamental
disciplines,--logic, metaphysics, and ethics.
It is not easy to define in a singel phrase the
subject commonly called Ethics in such a manner as to
meet with general acceptance; as its boundaries and
relations to cognate subjects are variously conceived
by writers of different schools, and rather indef'initely
by mankind in general. Nor does the derivation of the
lAbraham Wolf', "Ethics," Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Vol. VIII, 14th ed.
9
10
term help us much. Ethics originally meant that which
relates to "character.1I The treatise of Aristotle's,
however, to which the term was first applied, is not
concerned with character considered simply as character,
but with its good and bad qualities. Indeed, the antith-
esis of "Good" and "bad", in some form is involved in
all ethical affirmation; and its presence constitutes
a fundamental distinction between the science or study'
of ethics and any department of physical inquiry.
Physics is concerned with what is, has been, or to be,
and its opposite. We must add, however, that the good
that ethics investigates is "good for man," to distinguish
it f'rom universal or absolute good, which is the subject-
matter of theology or ontology; and again, if we are to
separate ethics from politics, the former as the study
of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered as individuals.
Neither of these distinctions, however, should be taken
to imply a complete devision of subjects; and neither,
it may be added, was reached at once and without effort
in the development of ethical reflection. In Platonism
we find Ethics and Ontology indissolubly blended; and,
indeed, in almost every philosophical system in which
the universe is comtemplated as having an ultimate end
or Good, the good of human beings is conceived as some-
how closely related to this Universal Good. So again
the connection between Ethics and politics is naturally
11
very intimate. We only know the individual man as a
member of' some society; what we call his virtues are
chief'ly exhibited in his dealing with his 1'ellows, and
his most prominent pleasures are derived f'rom inter-
course with them; thus it is a paradox to maintain that
man's highest good is independent of'his social relations,
or of' the constitution and condition of'the community of'
which he f'orms a part. So, again., it Vlould be generally
admitted that a statesman ought to aim at promoting the
wellbeing of'his f'ellow citizens considered as individual;
and if' so, the investigation of the particulars for such
wellbeing must be an integral part of politics. Still
it is manif'est that the good of'an individual man can be
separated as an object of study from the good of his
community; so that the ethical point of view has to be
distinb~ished from the political, however large a field
these two studies may have in cormnon.
When, however, we thus isolate in thought the
individual man from his polity, the close connection of
Ethics with Psychology becomes manifest. It is plain
that the chief' good of man cannot consist in anything
external and material, such as wealth; nor even in
mere bodily health and wellbeing, whd ch experience will
Show to be compatible with extreme badness and wretch-
edness. And though it is perhaps true that "goodness
is commonly attributed to men from the consideration
12
held that a certain state of the agent's mind, a cer-
tain quality of disposition, motive, intention or pur-
pose, is essential to the perfect moral goodness of an
action. 111 Thus most all ethical schools would agree
that the main object of their investigation must belong
to the psychical side of human life; whether they hold
that ultimate good is to be fO'.U1.din psychical exdabence
regarded as merely sentiment and emotional, identifying
it with some species of desirable feeling or pleasure,
or the genus or sum of such feeling, or whether they
rather maintain that wellbeing of the mind must lie
soley or chiefly in the quality of its activity. And
when V'feattempt to wor-k out either view into a clear
and complete system, we are led inevitably to further
psychological study, in order to examine different
kinds and degrees of pleasure and pain, determine the
nature and mutual relations of the different virtues or
good qualities of character, and their opposites. So,
again, in discussing the flliLdwnentalquestion as to
What is ultimately good or desirable, "moralists are
led to observe carefully what men actuallY do desire
and aim at, and thus to analyze fully the process of
Voluntary action, as well as the emotional states that
precede and prompt to it. In fact it \'dll appear that
all important ethical notions are also psychological,
l"Ethics," Americanized Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Vol. IV, 20th Cen. ed.
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except the fundamental antithesis of 'good' and 'bad'
or 'right' and 'wrong' with which psychology is not
primarily concerned any more than physics."l
But Ethics is concerned with 'correct' conduct.
It is concerned with what is 600d for man, what is
right for man, or what is just for man. Indeed, there
is a sense in which justice is the essence of morality,
and a sense in which morality is the essence of Ethics.
This idea is upheld by large majority of ethical schol-
ars.2
Aristotle and His Ethics
Before Aristotle, problems of ethics had re-
ceived no small amount of attention, and for Plato they
became the subject of a considerable portion of his
writings. But ethical considerations, even in the
Republic, were dealt with along with other interests,
and were not segregated for systematic treatment. As
Aristotle was the first to segregate the problems of
logic and present a systematic treatment of them, thus
founding the science of forrr.allogic, so he was the
first to offer a systematic book of ethics, The Nico-
machean Ethics. As a pioneer work in its field, and
written by one who was destined to exert unprecedented
lIbid.
2 "Ethics," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. VIII, 14th ad.
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'influence upon European scholars during the Middle Ages~
and through them upon Christian theology, this book
deserves to be rated as the most influential ever pro-
duced in its field.
In the authentic works of Aristotle we have
under the head of ethics two treatises--"the E..'udemian
Ethics (so called from Eudemus, one of Aristotle's
pupils), and the Nicomachean Ethics (which derives
its name from his son Nicomachus). It is now held
that the former is a genuine work of Aristotle, belong-
ing to the middle period of his life, which was subse-
quently edited by Eudemus, and that the latter is a
statement, edited by his son, of his final views on
ethics in the last period of his life."I As indicated
in the preceeding paragraph, it is the latter which
will form the basis for our study of justice.
Aristotle's most fundamental disagreement with
Plato was on the nature of the method which should be
adopted for philosophical inquiry. Whereas Plato sought
to explain particulars in terms of universals which
they manifest, Aristotle insisted upon beginning investi-
gation with particulars, as we actually experience them.
Thus, in ethical inquiry Plato thought it necessary to
explain the specific good act in terms of the universal
lErnest Barker, trAristot1e," Encyclopedia Britan
~, Vol. II, 14th ed.
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Good , which it manifests. '1.'hespecific is good precisely
because it contains in some measure the nature of the
supreme Good. On the other hand_, Aristotle could see no
reason to begin with a supreme Good in the discussion of
ethics, whd.ch is concerned with what is good for ~.
What is good for man may be discovered, not through an
appeal to a metaphysical idea, but through painstaking
examination of the facts of man's experience. So he
writes:
Some philosophers ••• have thought that, be-
sides these several good things (pleasure, health,
wealth, fame, etc.), there is an "absolute" good
which is the cause of.'their goodness •••• But we
must not omit to notice the distinction that is
drawn between the method of proceeding from your
starting-points or principles, and the method of
working up to them. Plato used with f.'itnessto
raise this question, and to ask whether the right
way is from or to your starting-·points, as in the
race-course you may run from the judges to the
boundary, or vice versa.
Wellft we must start from what is known ,
But 'what is known" may mean two things:
IIwhat is known to us," which is one thing, or
"what is known!' simply, which is another.
I think it is sage to say that we must start
from what is known to us.
And on this account nothing but a good moral
training can qualify a man to study what is noble
and just--in a word, to study questions of Politics.
For the undemonstrated fact is here the startine;-
point, and if thisundemonstrated fact be suff.'iciently
evident to a man, he will not require a "reason why. III
Though avowedly an empiricist who will seek to
derive whatever general principles may prove available
1Aristotle, Nichomachean EthiCS, trans. W. D. Ross
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), Bk. i. iv.
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from the data of human experience, neverthelass, Aristotle,
no less than Plato, is interested in discovering the ends
toward which particular beings are developing. 'I'he dif-
ference between the two at this point is illustrated, if
not caused in part, by the diversity of their scientific
interests. Plato found his chief scientific interest
to lie in the field of mathematics, where reasoning had
to do with abstract concepts and changeless forms. The
Circle, the square, the triangle--these belong to an
order of relations which is eternally changeless and
certain in its order a.ndbeautiful in the harmony and
precision of its organization. Aristotle, on the other
hand, was interested primarily in biology. Here no
eternal order of changeless forms was evident, but num-
erous individual organisms, more or less alike, yet dis-
tinct, and all in the process of development. Each
seemed to have its peculiar characteristics and potenti-
alities, according to which the development proceeded.
Each, we may say, had its own end, not altogether unlike
that of others of its species, but never identical with
any other. There was never exact equality anywhere.
Each was seen to be moving toward an end of complete
self-realization, often slol'Jlyand with effort. But
what can be better for the specific organism than to
develop itself to the full? Surely it Vlould not be
17
better to be forced into the pattern of rolother. But
wher-e shall the individual find the pattern for its
larger and as yet unrealized being? Not in some trans-
cendental world of ideas, for such ideals can be of no
more use to the flower, or the frog, or to a man, than
their star might be. The ideal pattern must be within
reach; it must be a part, though as yet an unrealized
part, of the individual's nature. It must, in some way~
provide both the direction for development and its
dynamic urge. At any moment, the individual is but
material to be constructed into a better future self,
but the incentive for the constructive effort can come
not from the material, but from the attractive power of
the end which is yet to be realized. In learning to
build a ship, or playa musical instrument, or practice
medicine, or play golf, the incentive which calls forth
one's effort is never the proficiency which has already
been attained, but that which is yet to be won. Oomplete
St\tis:Caotion in the present state is complacency, but it
is also death. Life is constituted of activities, and
activities are stimu~ated by something which seems desir-
able, but is not yet fully possessed. A world and an
individual are dead, in so far as they are without the
power of responding to the gravitational puil of potenw
tialities yet to be realized. For Aristotle, the principle
18
is a universal one. In the life of plants and animals,
the urge may be a mute pull of the forces ,of nature;
in man, it becomes at least partly articulate to con-
sciousness, and capable of recognition and appreciation
in consciously directed efforts to attain the ideals of
the spirit.
If we direct our thought to the central problem
of ethics, namely, ~ II ,S9od f£E. human ~, we find
a large number of things which may be regarded as good.
These differ for different people; thus, skill in con-
struction is good for the shipbuilder, in horsemanship
for the equestrian, in fighting for the soldier, and in
the treatment of desease for the physician. Aristotle
then inquires: if there are so many _goods, what is it
they have in common that entitles them all to be called
good? It is his conclusion that goods are of two kinds:
some things are good in themselves while others are good
because they assist us in securing what is good in itself;
that is, some goods are intrinsic, while others are instru-
mental. Of these two, intrinsic goods obviously are
more desirable, being valued for themselves. But what
does man always value for itself as a final end? Aristotle
answers, happiness. "Happiness seems more than anything
else to answer to this description (of final end): for
we always choose it for itself, and never for the sake
a&d 2
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of something else; while honor and pleasure and reason,
and all virtue or excellence, we choose partly indeed
for themselves (for, apart from any result, we should
choose each of them), but partly also for the sake of
happiness, supposing that they will help to make us
happy. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of
these things, or as a means to anything else at all."l
Aristotle warns us, however, that he is speaking of man
not as an individual, but as a social being. The happin-
ess of those affected by our actions is to be considered,
as well as our own. But how is man to find happiness?
For Aristippus the answer lay in the accumulation
of pleasure, but not so for Aristotle. Many pleasures,
indeed, may disturb happiness. '1'0 secure an answer, he
suggests an analysis of man's function, for liasthe
goodness and the excellence of a piper or a sculptor,
or the practiser of any art, and generally of those who
have any function or business to do, lies in that function,
2if he has one." Since man possesses life in common even
with the plants, the life of mere nutrition and growth
cannot be thought of as peculiarly his. LikevIise, the
life of the senses he shares in common with horses and
cattle and other animals. That which is peculiar to man
lIbid., i. vii. 2Ibid•
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is his life of reason. It is man's unique function to
exercise his faculties and to conduct his actions always
in the light of reason. The function of the harper and
of the good harper is the same, but the good harper prac-
tices his art with greater proficiency. So, the function
of man and of the good man is the swne; the good man con-
duc~himself more consistently and more completely by rea-
son. Every being becomes happy through the development
of its ovm nature, and so man, through the exercise of
reason, which is the peculiar property of his nature as
a human being. However, in the rational man, the devel-
opment is in two direction~,one, that of the ethical, the
other, that of the intellectual or dianoetic virtues.
Happiness is an tlactivity of the soul,tI and not of the
body, hence it is with the soul that Aristotle is here
concerned. But according to him, the soul has two
parts" an irrational and a rational part. Of the irra-
tional part, there are two divisions: that wha.ch causee
nutrition and growth, and is possessed in common with
the plants and animals, and that which resists reason,
as in the incontinent man, within whose life there is
an irra,tional element str·uggling against rational desire
for temperance and poise. Likewise, the rational part
of the soul has two divisions: tlonerational in the
strict sense as possessing reason in itself, the other
21
rational as listening to reason as a man listens to his
father. ,,1 Ex 11 i th.p ice ence n e ~ormer s called intellectual
virtue; excellence in the latter, moral virtue. 'l'hus
wisdom, understa.nding, a.ndprudence are intellectuD.l
virtues, while liberality and temperance are moral.
Socrates had taught that man cannot know the
better and yet choose to do the worse. Aristotle, on
the contrary, was forced by his observation of actual
experiences to acl{nowledge that desire, thought it be
based on defective Imowledge, yet may exert a stronger
influence on the will than rational insivpt. However,
if man is to live a balanced and self~ontrolled life,
he must learn to folloW the guidance of rational knowledge
even in the face of hiS strongest desires. How is this
to be accomplished'? Aristotle replies that such eontrol
is to be ~chieved through practice- Moral excellence is
largely the result of habit and custom, for "none of
the moral excellences or virtues is implanted in us by
nature; for that '""hicb.is by nature cannot be altered
by training. ,••_ 'l'hevirtues, then, come neither by na-
ture nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity
for acquiring them, and this is developed by training ••••
'llhevirtues we acquire by doing the act, as is the case
with the arts, too. We learn an art by doing that which
1 . i·.Ibid., J.. X J.J..
a_4&&&d,tl."A]
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we wish to do when we have learned it; we become build-
ors by building, harpers b7 he.rping. And so by doing
just a.cts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance
and courage we become temperate and courageous.1I It is
in our actions that our characters are built up, for "both
the mor-aL virtues and the corresponding vices result from
and are formed by the same acts.; a.nd this is the case
with the arts also. It is by harping that good harpers
and bad harpers 8.1ike are produced: and SO with builders
and the rest •••• And it is just the same with the vir-
tues also. It is by our conduct in our intercourse with
other men that we become just or un just , and by acting
in circumstru~ces of danger, and training ourselves to
feel fear or confidence, that we become courageous or
cowardly •••• In a word, acts of any kind produce habits
or characters of the same kind."l Thus we see that while
men prefer that which gives them happiness, yet what vTill
give them happiness is a matter to be determined largely
by what they have been trained to enjoy. What 8.nyone
enjoys constitutes an index of his character and education.
"The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be
taken as a test of the forned habit or character •••• It
is pleasure that moves us to do what is base, and pain
that moves us to refrain from what is noble. And therefore,
lIbid., ii. i, ii.
23
as Plato S8.YS, man needs to be so trained from his youth
up as to find pleasure and pain in the right objects, and
this is what sound education means ..,,1
Chief among the virtues in which man should be
educated are always those of the speculative life, and
only from the exercise of these may we expect happiness
in fullest degree. For happiness does not consist in
amusement, "and it is absurd to suppose that ....we toil
and moil all our life long for the sake of runusing our-
. 2selves." Happiness comes with the exercise of virtue,
and it is reasonable to suppose that the greatest happin-
ess will be found in the exercise of the greatest virtue,
which as we have seen, is that of lithebest part of us,"
namely, speculative reason. It is that part or faculty
of our nature which "seems naturally to rule and take
the lead, and to apprehend things noble and divine--
whether it be itself divine, or only the divinest part
of us." The full exercise of this faculty of reason,
which consists of "speculation and contemplation," will
be perfect happiness.
Of the endurance of pain, the rejection of cer-
tain pleasures for the aake of some worthy objective,
and conscientious self-denial, the late Professor r_r'homas
H. Green wrote:3
lIbid., ii. iii. 2Ibid., x. vi.
3T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1906) p. 279.
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In the root of the matter the Greek conception
of these virtues is thoroughly sound. rl'heyare con-
s~dered genuine only when resting on a pure and good
wl11, which is a will to be good--a will directed
not to anything external, nor to anything in respect
of which it is passive, but to its own perfection to
the attainrrlentof what is noblest in human character
and action. In this respect that which we may call
after its first clear enunciators, the Platonic or '
AFistote1ian conception of virtue ••• is final. It
marks the great transition, whenever and however
achieved, in the development of the idea of true good
from the state of mind in which it is conceived as
a wellbeing, more or less independent of what a man
is in himself, to that in which it is conceived as
a wellbeing consituted by character and action.
or the Good, treated from the viewpoint of the individual
human being, is not completelY satisfactorY in that it
does not point an absolutelY clear and distinct way to
that Happiness or that Character which he holds as the
end and aim of individual life. The difficulties en-
countered lie chieflY within the human being himself.
His nature is such that no single, clearly defined ideal,
emotion or activity stands out as the sole end supreme
and above the other character-attributes of the person.
This Good as an end, and the means of securing that Good
for oneself, was the favorite topic of the ancient Greek
moralists and philosophers, who, from Socrates through
Plato, the cyniCS, cyrenaic., Epicureans and others,l
The outcome of Aristotle's conception of Virtue
Aristotle's Definition of Justice
IF. Thi11Y, ~istory of PhilosophX, 1914, Sec. 11-16.
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magnified the Sage and set him above every other man
because he could, in spite of inimical and malignant
circumstances, still retain his virtue and peace of
mind intact and unsullied. To Aristotle belongs the
special credit of discerning that even the Sage must
live in a community,--even though, like the Cynics
with Diogenes at their head, he seeks to sever all
possible connections with his fellows and with the
world which contaminates him. 'llherefore,this greatest
of Greek empiricists moves with steady and sure dis-
cernment from Ethics as a study of the individual Good
over to Politics, a study of the state's relation to
that Good; from the Good to the proper distribution of
the Good among citizens. This distribution is Justice.
Justice, in the briefest terms, distributes Goods (1)
equally among equals; or, (2) equitably according to
merit.
Aristotle begins his discussion of justice in
the Nichomachean Ethics with a formal definition of
justice by saying: "With regard to justice and injustice,
we must consider (1) what kind of actions they are connected
wi th; (2) what sort of mean justice is; and (:::,)between
what extremesthe just act is intermediate.lIl This original
consideration of justice as an act of a man immediately
lAristotle, OPe cit., v , 1.
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leads him to say, "We see that all men mean by justice
that kind of state of character which makes people dis-
posed to do vrhat is just, and makes them act justly and
wish for what is just; and sLmiLar-Ly , by injustice that
state wh.Lch makes them act unjustly and wish for what
is un just ,,,1 His point of view is "the just man It; and
this does not change whether he is thinking of the or-
dinary citizen dealing justly with his fellow-citizens,
or the judge on the bench meeting out justice to litigants.
The latter is a man also, but invested accidentally with
the special power-s of the state. Justice, as the dis-
tribution of Goods, does not therefore alter its essen-
tial character.2 It still remains tlthat state of char-
acter which. makes people disposed to do what is just;
or, it is virtuous activit:), performed by either a judge
or citizen. ,,3 As such, justice is rightly called a
species under the genus "Virtue" and defined functionally
as well as logically as an expression of a virtuous dis-
position of character.
'1'hi8personal point of view whd ch makes justice
an attribute of character belonging to the good man is
difficult to retain throughout the discussion, and it
sometimes seems to disappear entirely and be absorbed
in relations. This appearance, however, is superficial.
lIbid., v , i. 3Ibid., v. ii.
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It merely advertises the fact that Aristotle has passed
f'rom a f'ormal def'inition of' justice as an expression in
the f'orrnof conduct toward the just man's fellowmen.
111he viewpoint is not lost if we hold fast the fact that
the just man performs several kinds of just actions,
which are very complicated in their structure, and are
perf'ormed f'or the purpose Qf rightly distrubuting Goods.
'i\fhol
• 1 e the man is a member of society, a citizen of the
state, at the moment of distributing justice either as
a judge or as a private citizen, he is a personal-social
self'--a self in society.
The complexity of the subject begins to mani-
fest itself when we try to folloW Aristotle's classi-
f'ication of kinds of justice. "It,is clear," he says,
"tin f j to ,,1at there is more than one kind 0 us ~ce. He
Varieties of Justice
makes a number of classifications not connected by any
f'undamerrtal prine iple : (1) uni v ers al, as lawf'ul; (2,1
particular, as f'air; again (1) distributive, concerned
with proper distribution of' goodS; (2) rectificatory,
concerned with the restoration of proper distribution
of' goods; and again, (1) reciprocity, or the maintenance
\
or a stric t equality or merit and demerit, -- "an eye f'or
an eye"; (2) its contrast, equity which transcends justice
------------------.------------,-----------------------------------
lIbid., v , ii.
, 2J nil!;". i'
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as strict equality, and tries to make a fair distribution
according to merit rather than according to the strict
letter of the law.
Justice, as Aristotle maintains is used in a
universal and in a particular sense. First, universal
justice "is complete virtue, but not obsolutely, but in
relation to our neighbor. III "And therefore Justice is
of'ten thought to be the greatest of virtues."2 But
not only is it the greatest virtue, but "it is complete
virtue" in that "proverbially 'in justice is every virtue
comprehended. ,,,3 "Justice in this sense then, is not
part of'virtue, but virtue entire; nor is the contrary,
injustice a part of vice but vice entire.... Vi/hatas
a relation to one's neighbor, is justice, is as a cer-
tain kind of' state without qualification, virtue •••• And
how the meanings of 'just' and 'unjust' are to be dis-
tin~lished, is evident, for practically the majority of
the acts commanded by the law are those which are pre-
scribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole ••••
They tend to produce good and are for education for the
common good.... Each of these, we say, is just. They
aim at the common advantage, either of all or of the
best or of those who hold pouer=, or something of the
sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that
tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components
1Ibid., v , i.
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for political society.lIl
This discussion which makes justice fundamental ,
and inclusive of all virtue, is based upon solid fom~d-
ations. students have long recognized the definition
of justice expressed in the Golden Rule as an absolutely
basic principle of morality, valid all the world over
and throughout all tiIDe2 expressed by at least half a
score of great moral and religioUS teachers of the
world.3
Nor is Aristotle's statement that this form of
justice is prescribedbY insitutes different from the
modern theory of law. For all legal enactments are
supposed to aim at justice; and hence, to be logical
deductions from the fundamental principle of that justice
which asserts that all men are equal before the law.
This principle, lying at the basis of legislation is
often concealed from sight by the ignorance of honest
men and the dishonesty of designing men and the corrupt
practices of venal judges; but in ideal, and that is all
a philosopher can be expected to discuss, instituted law
is based up~n the principle of justice. Universal
justice is the distribUtion of "Goods" equallY among___________ .----------------------
lIbid.
2Henry Sidgwick, liistory of Ethics, (London:
MaclVIillan& Co., 1931)
3 "Golden Rule" ];nco of Rel. & Eth., ed. James
Hastings, VI, 311. '
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equals and according to merit and demerit.
Particular justice, according to Aristotle,
is that which is fair and equal in particular trans-
actions. It is divided into distributive, dividing
up "h . If donor, or money, or other th~ngs ; an rectifica-
tory, "which plaYs a rectifying part between man and
man."
CHAPTER III
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ADM:INISTERING JUS'llICE BY LAW
The impracticab1eness of administering justice
limited strictly to a relation of equality between equals
even wh en that justice is administered by presumably
perfect laws and perfect judges is not only felt by
Aristotle, but the remedy for its limitations pOinted
out. He still retained justice as an ideal, but he
sees that it can never be fully attained among men
because they all differ from one another. He begins
his treatment of this subject with: "Our next subject
is equity and the equitable and their respective rela-
tions to justice and the just.tl1 He says that the
equitable is just, but not legally just, rather a cor-
rection of legal justice •
.~ter saying this, he opens the door for the
ingress into his ideally perfect system of justice of
a practical idea which, though he does not perceive it,
is virile and fruitful enough to develop into an entirely
new system working under justice as an ideal, aiming
always to attain it, but threatening to nullify it.'
1Aristot1e, OPe cit., v. x.
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For this equity which corrects the law by allowing :for
extenuating circumstances and for ends as well as causes
,
must perform that revision independent of legal statutes.
The law is weak on account of its universality. "The
reason
tt
for equity "is that all law is universal
ll
but
it must be applied to concrete cases wherein the strict
ietter of the law applied would '1101'1< injustice. "This
is the reason why all things are not determined by law,
viz., that about some things it is impossible to lay down
law, so that a decree (by jUdges) is needed."l The flex-
ibility of equity he illustrates by saying that this
adjustment of the general rule to the special situation
is lil<e "the leaden rule used in mal<ing Lesbian moulding;
the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is
not rigid.,,2 The administration of equity involves the
interpretation and the modification of the law to suit
the particular case. Who maMs the adjustment? Not the
law; for it must be interpreted; not some other law,
which in turn would need at times to be interpreted,
and so on ~ infinitu!!!. LaW, therefore, breal<s down.
It cannot administer justice. It itself must be cor-
rected by individual human judgment, that faculty "in
virtue of which men are said to be Isympathetic judges, I
and to have I judgment, I" or "the right discrimination
,.,:au:: LA :;;;aaa&li; ,_
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of the equitable. ,,1 Judgment and understanding and
practical wisdom and intuitive reason all deal with
ultimates or particulars; and look in two directions to
the first terms and the last, that is, it must consider
both the efficient caUses of an act and also its final
cause, or purpose. Thus it becomes evident that this
matter of justice cannot be legalistically controlled.
The purely human factors in it rebel against being con-
fined within an automatic, mathematical formula. Justice
itself demands something higher than itse1f,--an equity
which does not tres-t human beings as "men in themselves,"
and hence always equal; but recognizes the mitigating
circumstances of heredity, environment and education,
all of which enter into the making of a man and leave
their residue as inherent parts of personality to be
taken into consideration in judging that personality.
lVloreover,no rule, maxim, law, or principle formulated
will automaticallY set the limits to which mitigating
circ~unstance may modify strict justice by mercy. The
decision in any particular case must be left to the
judgment of some person who looks backward at the cir-
cumstance and forward to the pers~nal and social con-
sequences of his decision, and concludes accordingly.
The importance of equity is immeasurable. First,
it treats a human being 1:1ke a human being and not like
1Ibid., vi. xi.
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an abstraction; or one stripped of all his adventitious
and also sometimes necessary attributes and disabilities,
and then judged. The whole man, as far as possible, is
taken into consideration. How far this consideration
can go depends upon the ability of the judge. A perfect
judge might see reaSons for pardoning every accused.
Secondly, the equity administered b-y"a rational judge
must also look toward the future and see what effect his
judgment may have upon the reform of the cu.lprit. Equity
aims at his good as well as it aims at his punishment for
deeds done. In the third place, equity nru.stalso greatly
enlarge the vision of the letter of the Law , and consider
in addition the good of society. Such increasing compli-
cations reveal how helpless are law-makers to frame regu-
lations detailed enough and numerous enough to take care
of the administration of justice in a co~~mity of any
size. Justice by law breaks down lamentably. ':ehisfact
emer-ges clearly from the great philosopher Is attempt to
define justice so clearly that it could be applied equi-
tably. Therefore he abandons justice by law and necessar-
ily replaces it with justice among men by equity adminis-
tered by a just judge.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NECESSITY OF PAUL'S JUSTIFICATION
What Is Justification
Justification is a word used to describe the
acquirement
of a status in respect to personal relations.
It is
not a production of a state and does not have reference
to Psychological conditions. The situation to wllich it
refers is the result of past action, not tile cause of
future activities-
resent
s , means "account rigbt eous •" It 1s us ad botll Ln
tile LXX and in the N.T., and is judical 1n idea, tllough
foren .S1C associations are not necessarilY present to
tM
mind of the writer whenever the word occurs-
Justification is tile act of sllowing, or tile
ground of mainta1nin&that some person is not censurable;
Or that something is just, right, or in aCcordance wHIl
law, especially wilen tllis is done fUllY and adequatelY.
Just·
1fication 1s vindication or defense. It imp11es an
acqu't
1 tal or declaration of righteousness wlletllertile
facts of tile case correspond witll tile pronouncement or
not.
~-
1
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In law it is
allegi ng and showing
fulness of the
to
act complained and sued for; as, in slander,
plead the truth of the words spolcen in justification
a plea in bar to a plaintiff's action
the righteous or rightfulness or laVl-
of the spe~ing. Or, it is the perfecting of bail by the
sUrety's ' .snOVil-ngbefore the court, that after payment of
all his debts, his property is worth more than the sum
for which he becomes bound.
A man is justified before a tribunal when: (1)
it is hs o,va that he did not commit the act with which
he is h
c arged; and (2) that he did indeed commit the
said act, but that, under the circumstances, it was
legal and right to do so. For example, a householder
is justified, freed from all guilt, from all penalty,
from all blame, and restored fUlly to former status as
a citizen, and that without cost to him, when he shoots
a theif who bre~s into hiS hOUse and threatens to murder
the ovmer. He is as innocent of crime in this situation
as the man who did not shoot an intruder. This is the
meaning of justification at the bar of human justice.
To apply this human conception and human custom without
change to judicial transactions between the Deity and man
1s illogical, for the relationshiP here has entirelY
Changed. Upon this fact rests Paul'S doctrine of justi-
fication by faith.
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In theology justification haS commonly been
called the furensic, judical, or graciOUs act of God
by which the sinner is declared righteous, or justly
free from obligations to penalty, "and fully restored
to d· "lVlne favor. The only instance in the LXX that
m'gh
1 t seem to indicate that justification does have
referenc e'to psychological conditions is &:f Q_ f<d'.""'
oIKc",'wO"c., T~\I - ; 1 i t i b bl i't> KAt ,/.v ft" wh'ch no mpro a Y mplie
s
an
act of self_justification before God rather than a
Process of self-cleansing. In every other case when the
word occurs, it is proof of righteousness that is implied.
In i
v ew of Romans 4:5 the.words of Exodus 23 :7--oil 511~(\I .i.-us
,
ToY ci (1"";;; ....~~ --should be noted (cf. Is. 5:23). ThuS the
verb becomes equivalent to "absolve"--e.g.s.s. 26:29.
In the N.T. the parable of the Pharisee and the publican
Shows the word as involving the sense both of self-justi-
cation and of absolution.2 The Epistle of James, in the
spirit of Christ's wordS in Mt. 12:37, regards ~braham'S
obedience and Rahab's loyalty as "JustifYing" them, because
the"
n actions are stamped bY the O.T. as Vlinningthe Divine
approval.S It sho~no sign of appreciating the deep ethical
.~se ~ich attaches to the word in the parable cited above.
Paul'S Doctrine of Justification
It is from Paul'S use of the verb in the Epistles
L
lps. 72: 13; (AV73).
3Ja. 2: 14-26.
i&liLW_
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to the Romans and Galatians that the term justification
has hac leved its permanent place in Christian theology.
The °d1 ea first appearsin connection with the controversy
between Paul and Cephas at Antioch,l when the latter,
having lived like the G~ntiles, separated himself with
other Hebrew Christians, because he feared certain persons
who came from J"ames. Paul represents himself as having
contended that the recognition of JesuS as Messiah meant
an acknowledgment that a man is not justified by the works
of the law, but through faith in JesuS Christ.
2
The old
antithesus between those who were Jews by nature and
sinners of the Gentiles3 had become little more thana
convention. Justification waS applied to a human being
as such (v 16 a.'vBtWffOS) , that henceforth living whether
" 4as do the Jews" or "as do the Gentiles,1I he might live
Unto God. This was the life "in Christ" which in its 5
"elation to God is spoken of as "justification in Christ."
On its Godward side it depended upon the death of Christ,
Which was "gratuitous" (v 21 &wfE. d.,,), if righteousness
were attained through the law, i.e. by outward compliance 6
With its ordinances, and not "in faith of the Son of God."
In the following chapter the idea is still fUrther expanded.
Paul appeals to the bestowal of the spirit, which waS an
1Gal. 2: 11-21.
4Gal. 2: 14.
2 2 16.Gal. :
5Ga1. ~: 17.
3Gal. 2,,:,15.
6Gal. 2: 20.
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actual experience of the Galatian converts. As a result
of he .arJ.ng the g9spel an effect had actuallY taken place
which was in itself the witness of a right relation be-
·tween God and the members of the Christian community. The
delivery of'the message had been met by, or rather, had
produced faith in those who heard. ~lhey had been enabled
to trust God and so become recipients of His grace. This
leads the Apostle to introduce two pivot passages from
the O.T., one from the LaW and the other from the prophets,
which expresses the principles that reach their consummation
in Christ. "Abraham believed God and it waS reckoned unto
him for righteousness. ,,1 "'llherighteous shall live as
a result of faith.,,2 The book of Genesis presents as
an initial act what HabakkUk represents as a continuing
Condition. 'llhepurpose of salvation begins wlth Abraham,
though the promise reaches its fruition in Christ. His
sUrrender to this purpose was an act of faith which the
o T "•• had rightly described as "reckoned for righteousness
because it enabled God to establish those relations with
h'am which, viewed from the manward side, constitute
"righteousness." And it can be carried forward to its
consummation in the full "vision,,3 or revelation only if
the attitude of faith is pe~nanentlY maintained.
The real scope of Paul's argument cannot be
1 .Gen. 15: 6.
..
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understood unless it is seen that he undercuts the whole
Controversy in which he had been involved. "Neither
circtun i 1c sion availeth an~hing nor uncircumcision."
The 1se ~-condenmed action of Peter in separating himself
from the Gentiles and the subsequent defection of the
Galatian church under stress of the demand that they
should submit to circumcision and its practical impli-
Cations had emphasized those precepts of the Mosaic system
which were occupied with ceremonial rather than with
conduct. It waS, in fact, ceremonial observance, and
not th e keeping of the Moral laW, that waS endangering
the ~reedom of the Gospel. This fact, though even in
fralatians the conception of law is not wholly confined
to these provisions, enabled Paul to perceive that moral
actions have only the value of ritual acts if regarded
Simply as L th f iconformity with laW. aW, ere ore, S a
system of regulation and has the value of discipline
(Gal '3 I f it hi h• ,: 24,,", b"yw Yo') • That particular foI'lll0 . w c
Was innnediatley in question, viZ. the MosaiC code, could
only have been meant to prepare those whose faith had
alre d f 11a y responded to the pr~ise for the u er response
which its fulfil1nent in Ghrist would demand. The Law
Was until Ghrist. Those .Thoare living uner the Law,
if they are justified at all, are justified as Abraham
-
lGal. 5: 6--6: 15; cf. I Oor. 7: 19.
m2UllI
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Was b, y trusting in God. Their obedience would be a
IIfruit of' the Spiritll in so f'ar as the life unto God was
granted in anticipation of the fulfilment of the promise
in Christ.
All this is implied, if not implicitlY stated, in
the argument concerning the faith of Abraham. In principle,
God' s dealings with mankind have always been the same.
Ris purpose has al,vays been to draw men into those rela-
t·~ons with Himself' which confer the status of'sonship,
the gift of' the spirit, and the possession of life, in
Christ. The historical work of Jesus is onl~ the sending
forth of the son in the fUllness of the time,l i.e. at
the appropriate moment in the educati6n of the human race.
The gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, who received
the promise, as afterwards to Christian disciples, who
have received "the promise of the spirit through fait!f~
The cross of Christ stands in living relation to both.
Jl.llalike were loved by the son of God, whO,gave Himself
for them.
that the lif'e that they nOw have
they live through faith in Hi:rn·
All alike must acknowledge, at least implicitlY,
or live in the flesh,
It nmst be observed that Paul uses the phrase "just-
if' 'ied in Christ.":> Here he combines in one sentence two
line hs of teaching, which manY modern interpreters ave
- --~-------------------------------------------------------
1Gal. 4: 4.
3Gal. 2: 17.
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found it difficult
tha.t lithe deepest
to correlate. It has been asserted
and most vital thought of the Apostle
"in Christ," and that theis expressed in the phrase
whole argument concerning justification by faith is only
a cont roversial device to account for the apparent para-
dox of' abandoning the Jewish system while acknowledging
Jesus 1as the fulfiller of the Messianic expectation."
The Epistle to the GalatianS is too obviouslY a vehement
attempt to express the personal experience manifested
in its autobiographic passages to make such a conclusion
P~obable, and the fUller elaboration of the soterio10gioa1
doctri ne in RomanS, which has no immediate referenoe to
Cont roversy, renders it praotioallY imPossible. The per-
Sonal history of Paul himself, if anY other point of oon-
tact were wanting, would in itself be suffioient to hold
together justification bY faith and the life of Christ
as representing two equallY important aspects of the one
Chriotio an experience. BUt at the very outset the Apostle
himself has welded them together in thiS conoeption of
jUstification in Christ, which may in turn be interpreted
by th "e phr-as e us ed in Romans 5:. 18, "juStificati
on of life.
Cond emnation, not a formal sentenoe but an attitude of
God towards transgressors, rests upon all those who "in
Adam" sin. So justifioation, i.e•.the aot of God whSre--bY
1.J. G. SimpSon, "~stificatiO!!'" ~CY10pedia of
and Ethic~, ed. James Hastings, VII, 616.
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he accepts mank4nd f th k~ or e sa e of what Ghrist has done,
of which the issue is life, rests upon all those who as
a con sequence live in Ghrist.
is that to
What we have to recognize
the mind of the Apostle justification
Divine act d,an only figurativelY a declaration.
metaphor is
is a
'l'he
forensic, but the fact is such only so far
as all forgiveness may be said to partake of this quality.
Being th e act of the living God, it is dynamiC, and as
sUch necessarily involves the infUsion of the Spirit.
Conse quently it brings with it love, joy, peace, etc.,
which is part of . f t ifthe essential experlence 0 he 1 e
in Christ. II IIBut inasmuch as by baptism we put on Christ
it is mand r es t i d i th~ that active faith is nvolve n e com-
Plex result. It is, therefore, all one whether we say
that we live the neW life "in Christ" or "through faith
in Christ." Paul's doctrine is not one of a mystical-, or
illIInediateunion ~ Ql?er5'.]U!erat,Q.,nor is it a mystery.
It is reached through a consciouS act of appropriation.
And then, too, the sending forth into our hearts of the
SPirit of the son,l though it issues in thO reproduction
ot Christ in us, an ethical as well as spiritual transforma-
tion bl d, is primarilY the mediUJJlthrough which we are ana e
to call upon God as Fatner. ThiS involves a dOgma
tio
,
which is not given in experience, but to whioh experience
testifies, viz. that we are no longer bondservants bUt-------------------------------------------------------------
l Gal. 4: 6.
-
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sons and heirs of God. The fundamental fact therefore
lies in the realm of absolute, theological truth. To
recognize Christ as Redeemer is to acknowledge Him as
the Messiah, by whom the Kingdom is being expanded, in
which a new status is conferred on every disciple expressed
under the firgure of "adoption." One might compare the
Epistle to the Ephesians, which takes up the language of
the earlier Epistles--"by grace have ye been saved through
fai th.J,-land interprets it to mean the translation of
sinners, through forgiveness by the sacrifice of the
cross, into the predetermined Kingdom of Christ. It is
cle'ar that Paul accepted in general outline the dogmatic
belief of the primitive community concerning the Kingdom
of the righteous, which had been brought in by the
exaltation of Jesus, which was already present to faith
in the life of the ecclesia, and whose final revelation
was anticipated in the sacraments. "We through the spirit
2by faith wait for the hope of righteousness,1I being
delivered by Him who gave himself for out sins out of
this present evil world there is, therefore, an eschato-
logical element in the idea of justification. It is
initial to the Christian life in the sense of ignaugurating
those relations with God which issue in the experience
of the SPrite It is final in so far as it is only
ultimately reached with that judgment which at the end
will extablish the Kingdom. Vfuat Paul criticized in the
lEph. 2: 8. 2Gal. 5: 5.
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Pharisaism o£ his contemporaries was not the passion £or
ethical righteousness, which he shared, but the spiritual
blindness which did not perceive the need of a new cre-
ation, of the uplifting of human life, whether Jewish or
Gentile, on to a new level, the IIJerusalem that is above,"
into which men must be reborn by a Divine act. This act
1is forgiveness to which justification is there£ore equivalent.
The Epistle to the Romans presents the teaching
o£ justification in a less controversial and more philo-
sophical spirit. First of all, it aff'irms the ethical
proposition that "not the hearers <;>fa law are just be-
2£ore God, but the doers of a law shall be justified.1I
This pr-Lnc Lp.Le is universal in its application, and holds
good of Gentiles who not having a law divinely expressed
in a revealed code, yet "shew the work o£ the law written
3in their hearts,tI i.e. in so far as they are obedient
to the dictates of conscience. Here it is clear that
ceremonial observance passes into the background. Law
means a moral ideal, as expressed, e.g., in the Ten Words,
but it is precisely here that the difficulty arises.
The condition of the world generally makes it abundantly
clear that mankind at large are under "the wrath of God"
mani£estly revealed in abominable lusts and passions, to
which they are enslaved. The experience of those who have
endeavored "to establish their own righteousness ,,4 by
IGal. 3: 6; Ro. 4: 6.
3Ro. 2: 15.
2Ro. 2: 13.
4sc , 10: 3.
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attempting to make their actions correspond to a known
stru~dard of rigteousness, such as the ethical code of
the Hebrews, only serves to convict them of innl@erable
transgressions, and of falling short of the glory of God.
Ideally the comman&nent which is holy, righteous, and
good is given to give life because it is a measure of
just conduct; but because men c~ot keep it, in effect
it brings their spiritual death,l because, as the measure
01' our own shortcomings it brings the knowledge of what
sin is, and that we do sin. Paul is here universalizing
his own experience, which is similar to that of every
man, and which is the ultimate basis of his argument.
He has been made aware of dertain appetites and passions
warring against his supreme rational desires, the standard
which reason and conscience approve, and bringing him
into enslavement under the law which forbids but does
not empower him to obey, which has provoked a cry for
deliverance.2 As in Galatians, there is a philosophy of
reason supporting the testimony of experience, which is
the pledge of an "eschatologicalll condemnation "in the
day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according
to my gospel, by Jesus Christ.1I3 This dogmatic governs
the form of statement. The desire to escape the stings
of conscience is the immediate, to stand as "righteousll
in the day of judgment the ultimate, yearning of the
1Eph. 2: 1. 2Ro. 7: 23,24.
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sinner. The greater includes the less.
So from the outset he proclaims his Gospel
as lithe power of God unto salvation to everyone that
believeth. 111 (
the Love for a personal God Incarnate~
To accept this message, to obey this Gospel, to be
"in (love with) Chri~t" is "to walk after the spirit,"
and to escape from sin in present experience, and so
to have the assurance that there is "no condemnation"
here or hereai'ter. The "righteousness of God," "-living,
a.ctive force disclosed ~ G~ist, is contrasted with "-
man I s Itown righteousness," which the revealed law showS
to have no existence in fact. This Divine righteousness
is "by 2faith untio faith. II .
to the conclusion that the law is weak because it can-
not empower a man to be righteous when he wants to be.
OnlY when his love for Ghrist comes to him does he find
the power.
The sad experience of the Apostle drives him
Faith conll3l
n
plates the manifestation of that
):'i hg teousness in the Person and work of Ghrist, the
trUstf dul acceptance of which as the gift of God lea s
to that faith by which, abandoning self_sufficienCY,
We become abedient, surrender ourselves, to it· First
of'all there is the .xperience of "newness of life,"
an identification with Ghrist so complete that Paul con
USe t t· "he expressions "buried with Ghrist in BaP ,sm,
1Ro. 1: 16~ Gal. 5: 6.
. .. ~.,
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"crucified with Christ," and "risen with him. til In
proportion as this faith is active in us, we henceforth
cease to serve sin; we are liberated from the law of'sin
and death and no longer find sin reigning in our mortal
bodies. The first fruits of the Spirit become manif'est
in the mor-t Lf'y Lng of the deeds of'the body. '1'helove
of Christ--the love of God in Christ--became, as the
Apostle had himself proved, an inf'luence so powerf'ul
that he could speak of Christ, or the Spirit of Ohr-d.e t
inhabiting his personality, the souree of'holiness and
of good works. But, as in Galatians, this is clearly
no unio mystica, transforming the character ex opere
operato, but a conscious fellowship based upon loyalty
and trust. As it is expressed in Ephesians, he had
yielded himself to the Redeemer, that Christ might dwe11
in his heart by faith.2
But, if this were all, the Death and Resurrection
of Christ Vlould remain unexplained, the relation of'these
facts to the reproduction of life of Christ in the believer
would be undefined. Once again, ther-ef'one , the ethical
result it taken as the pledge of that altered relation-
ship to God which was dogmatically expressed in the
theology of the primi t:i.ve community as the covering
effect of' the work of' Christ on our behalf. "The Spirit
himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the
2Eph. 3: 17-19.
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children of God.Hl The actual, realized effects wrought
in those who were admitted to the fellowship of disciples,
the fulf'illing of the ordinances of the law in those who
were walking not after the flesh but after the spirit,
are the irmnediate and subjective pledge of an ultimate
and objective relationship between the members of the
cormnunity reconciled in Christ on the one hand and Him
who is God and Father on the other. Viewed from the side
of God's action, which is all along spontaneous, paramount,
and free, this condition is brought about by grace or
free favor. On man's side it results f'romfaith, which
is not a menitorious and independent act, but is itself
a Divine gift, the reflex in human experience of free
grace.
That the Pauline doctrine is forensic in form
rather than in fact should be clear from the following
considerations. The Apostle necessarily contrasted
freedom and joy of his experience as a Christian, and the
altered relationship to God, to which it testified, with
his former experience as a Pharisee. He had believed
that as a circruncised Hebrew he had been admitted to a
community in which the strenuous observance of the Mosaic
Law both on the ceremonial and on the moral side afforded
a meritorious ground for the final sentence of the Divine
Lawgiver and would procure his acceptance. \JVhathe had
1.Ro. 8: 16.
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once hoped to attain by a process of legal compliance
had now been 'reached by the establishment of relations
which were not legal at all, viz. by the free exercise
of God I s fatherly love towards him in Christ, which had
awakened a responsive trust. This is the essential Christ-
ian experience, however it be expressed. Its note is the
restoration through forgiveness of personal relations
with a Father, not the satisfaction of the claims of a
Lawgiver. rrhus the term tljustification," as used to ex-
press what the N .rr.elsewhere calls "salvation, ,,1is for-
ensic in what it denies rather than in what it affirms.
But, inasmuch as Pharisaism arises out of that stage in
the education of man in which he learns to recognize the
holy love of God through the disciplinary revelation of
His character in the precepts of a formal law, the con-
ception of salvation is not adequately expressed unless
it is seen in relation to what lithelaw could not do in
that it was weak.1I Nor must we fail to perceive that
faith is not an antecedent condition, but is involved
in the idea of justification, so that the method cannot
be separated from the fact. \Nhat the gospel means by
"thy faith hath saved thee" Paul expresses by saying
that we are justified through faith. The correlatives
which together are the keynote of ju.stification are
grace and faith, the former being the activity of God's
personality towards man as realized and expressed in the
lcf. Hastings Dictionary of the Bible, Article,
"Salvation."
---------------------.--.- ....-----------~.---..--
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historical work of' Christ, the latter being the activity
of' man's personality towards God who thus manif'ests Him-
self' as Redeemer. They are indeed two ways of expressing
the same relation vi.ewed f'rom opposite sides. It is logic,
not experience, that separates them, end that requires a
third term like justif'ication to express the resultant
of' both. But it is f'aith that is the norm of the Pauline
theology. And justi.fication must always be interpreted
in the light or the experience :Lmpl:i.citin the Apostle's
obedience to the heavenly vision and summed up in the
declaration: rtThe lif'e that I now live in the f'lesh, I
live in faith, f'aith in the Son of God, who loved me
1and gave himself f'orme."
The connection between justification and baptism,
though Paul does not himself explicitly adjust the terms,
arises out of the f'act that IIweare justified in Christ";
i:"e. Christ is the sphere in which justification takes
place. The Son of God is revealed not merely to, but in,
2the believer and this because he is "created in Christ
:3Jesus." The purpose of God was litosum up all things
in Christ.1I4 The mystery of the Divine will was "the
one body,tI in which all believers are reconciled to
the Father through the Cross. Thus "we are members
one of another,tI which for Paul is the reason and motive
4of' the ethical lif'e. Paul's doctrine of the body of
JLGal• 20. 22: Gal. 1: 16.
3 4Eph. 2 : 10. Eph. 4: 25; Ro. 12: 5.
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Christ , or the ecclesia, is the counterpart in his theo-
logy o:f the Kingdom to which in the Gospels the forgive-
ness fo sins stands in a constant relation- Similarly,
to be ".Justified in Ghrist" is !pso Kacto, to be placed
in reI ation to the body in which is realized the fell
ow
-
ship or the one Spirit. And baptism is the act of initi-
ation into the Christian felloWShiP,l wherein faith per-
fects itself and thus becomes the starting-point of the
life in Christ. In this rite the believer washes away
his . 2 3s~ns and puts on Ghrist not becaUse he cannot achieve
thes e results by faith, but because he can "appropriate
the f orgiveness of sins bY faith onlY when he unites in
his fal.'that . tonce trust in God and Ghrist, and the ,n en-
tion to ,,4connect himself with the community of believers.
En, 4Ritschl Rechtferti n und VerSob!lun iii, 20,
or5' tr., Edinbu;g 1900 p. 111, quoted in Hastings EnC'Rel
e
and Eth., Justifi£a~o~, VII, 617.
LCor. 12: 13.
CHAPTER V
HISTORY OF JUSTIFICATION
While the doctrine of justification is in its
formal outline peculiar to Paul, there is no opposition
in principle between it and other N.T. methods of ex-
pressing the meaning of salvation. The Petrine teaching,
though in the later development of the First Epistle it
is influenced by the Pauline theology, remains less tech-
nical and less fully formulated. The disagreement at an
earlier stage between the two Apostles, so for as it was
determined by intellectual causes, may be traced to this
1fact, and not to any fundamental contradiction, like
that which determined the attitude of Paul's JUdaiistic
antagonists, who failed to recognize in Jesus the Messiah
a spiritual, and therefore a Divine, Redeemer. The Johan-
nine conception of salvation, though not ignoring faith
is expressed in other categories, and the early rise of
Gnosticism, with its imperfect attempt to explain hOVI
God becrune man, tended to fix the interest of religious
thinkers upon the doctrine of the Person of Christ as the
fundamental problem of Christian theology. According to
:LJ• G. Simpson, "Justification," Encyclopedia of
Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, VII, 618.
l
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satisfaction which Jesus gives to the religious
need fo redemption, the exigencies of repeated controversies
tended to supplant the idea of faith, which sees in it an
attitude of trustful self-committal to the reconciling will
Of God expressed in JesuS Christ, by another and a narrower
concept"lon, which represents it as assent, whether intelligent
or not, to the doctrine of the Person of Christ as formulated
in cre de s and their corollaries.1I The growth of the Church
system ", relnforced by the natural tendency of the maJority
Of mankind to be content with conformity to established
and traditional institutions as a sufficient discharge of
the Divl"ne "claims upon them, converted organized Christlanity
into a liNew Law." When the hunger for salvation, which the
Mosaic system had failed to allay in the case of Paul,
began to reassert itself in the western Church, Augustine
Partially i b t ith treaffirmed the Pauline pos tion, u W ou
rising to its characteristic and essential principle.
Interpreting justificatiOn by a false appeal to its etym-
Ology ( ti f 1justum facere) , he recovered the concep on 0 sa-
'Vati tIton as a free gift of God, but failed adequa e y 0
realiZe that it involved the re_establiShment of.personal
rel t repa ions with the Father through Christ. Grace waS -
resented as a supernatural life infUsed into human nature
---
Simpson l' II, the greatest fathers of the church (e.g. Athan-
asius) "percelved that Christology must ultimately be deter-
m·lned by the
1Ibid.
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through sacramental channels and gradually built up into
a righteousness which was not meritorius only because it
was imparted rather than achieved. Thus his teaching was
a more or less materialized form of the Pauline doctrine
of sanctification, i. e. the process by wh Lch God trans-
forms into the image of Christ those whom he has already
accepted for His children through faith in Jesus. The
initial action, which alone is covered by the N.T. view
of justification, was entirely omitted by Augustinianism,
which became the accepted mould of the mediaeval theology,
the standard expression of which is found in the Summa
of Thomas Aquinas. Thus in his Summa Theologica (ii. 1
qUe 100) he asserts that gratia justificans is quiddam
reale et positivum in the soul, a super-natural quality,
infused like the virtues--faith, hope, and love--of which
it is the cause. In conformity with this view is his
doctrine of faith. Though involving the obedience of
the will at least when formed by love, it is primarily
intellectual assent and has reference to symbols or
creeds rather than to the redemptive per-soria'Ld ty of God,
and is a preliminary condition of justification rather
than its channel. As Mr. Simpson states:l
In its imperfect stage (fides informis) it is
scarcely distinguished from the forced assent
to truth which is wrung even from devilS, who
l
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"believe and tremble, II (Summ. 1'heol. ii 2, qu 1-10).
'I'hese ideas were stereotyped by the Council of 'l'rent,
after being disputed by Humanists and reformers, in
the "Decr, do Justificatione,1I which published an
anathema against those who declare that men are
justified either by imputation of Christ's right-
eousness alone, or by remission of sins alone, exclud-
ing the grace by which we are justified as only the
favour of' God (Conc. Trid., sess VI., IIDeerdo Justif, II
can XI.)
The pont of this position is not the objection offered
to the phrase "imputation of Christ's righteousness,ul
which is admittedly not scriptual, but to the identifica-
tion of grace with an'imparted gift, and to the consequent
description of justification as a gradually realized psy-
chological condition. This, as we have seen above, is the
point wh er-eAugu st.Lnet s system parted company with Paulinism,
and opened the way to the re-establishment of salvation by
merit, which was characteristic of the formal teaching of
the Inediaeval Church. For a supernatural gift, if it be
transmuted through the prescribed s8cramental means into
virtues in human character, becomes the achievement of the
possessor, precisely as the results of labor, though not
obtained without the employment of material, are acquired
by the wor-ker-, 'I'rrus Aquinas, in oppostition to the spirit
of Paul, allows that fides est meritorium. It is easy,
therefore, to see how a compromise was effected with the
party that had most keenly opposed the Augustinian view
of grace to produce that combination of sacramental mys-
ticirun and ecclesiastical
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J.egalism which represents the view of salvation current
in the Middle Ages. Emphasis w[:',s laid, on the one hand,
upon the mediation through sa.craments of Divine influences.
The personal, ethical relation to God, of which faith, as
expounded in the Pauline Epistles, is the pledge, and
justification, as similarly set forth, the expr-eeaLon ,
had no place in official theology.
According to Mr. Simpson the 16th century saw the
rediscovery of the N.T. doctrine of justification. This
was rendered possible in the first instance by the Revival
of Learning, which -threw men back upon the original Greek,
promoted textual exegesis, and prepared the way for
BiblicHl as distinguished from scholastic theologyo
But the renewed Imowledge of Greek was not the only key
to a living interpretation of the N.T. The awakening of
personali ty, the meaning of wh Lch had been only imperfectly
understood whether by the classical, the patristic, or
the mediaeval mind, quickened those religious needs
which only an experience akin to that which produced the
Pauline theology could adequately satisfy. l'he story
of Luther, laboriously climbing the Santa Seala at Rome,
till the words of Habakkuk twice cited by Paul in his
crucial arguments--IIThe just shall live by faithll--sent
him incontinently down the steps with a revolution in
his soul, is tupical of the Reformation. For Luther,
as for Paul, the vision of God in Christ brought trust
I
57
in His f'atherly love as manifested in the person and wor-k
of' the Redeemer, vrith the consequent assurance of free
f'orgiveness and a personal share in the purpose of salvation.
This is the essential Christian experience, and though,
as Hooker affirms in his sermon on tlJustification,II there
have doubtless been in all ages thousands who have been
the subjects of it (Serm.ii, 8 ff.), it is difficult to
find room for it in the official theology of mediaeval
Catholicism. Confidence in God became the mark alike
of Luther's own teaching and of reformation theology,
and confidence is nothing else but faith avrare of itself'.
It is the subjective aspect of the restored personal re-
lation, or reconciliation vlith God, by which it is inspired,
and vlhich consitute what Protestants have a.Lwaysmeant by
justification.
Neither the general outlines of the teaching
of the Reformation nor the particular theories of individual
writers correspond in every detail with the Pauline state-
ment. These last do not, of course, agree one with another,
either in terminology, in scope, or in adjustment to other
balancing principles. Fur-bh er , it must be borne in mind
not only that the phraseology of Paul is to be interpreted
in relation to the N.T. generally, but also that his Epistles
do not present us with systematic theology. The upheaval
of religious thought in the 16th century followed upon
a long dogmatic history, in relation to which its theology
was reconstructed. Vfuile, therefore, Paul speaks of faithl
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being reckoned for righteousness, Protestant divines
used lithe imputation of righteousness"l as a technical
term de~ined in respect to a general body of doctrine,
and justi~ication by ~aith becomes justification by ~aith
only.
The deviation in the latter case is due not to
an exaggeration of Paul's teaching, but to the conditions
of the later controversy. The Reformers did not deny
that hope and love no less than faith were necessarily
present in those who are justified. What they saw was
that to connect those virtues with justification itself
was to shift the meaning of the term from the Biblical
to the mediaeval sense. Whether "Imputation of righteous-
nessli is to be regarded as a Biblical idea depends upon
whether such a phrase as titherighteousness which is of
God"2 has a positive content, and means, e.gt., the merits
of Christ, 01'1 whether it is Simply equivalent to the
status of those to whom faith is reckoned for righteous-
ness. But wh.a't is really imvolved here is not so much
the meaning of justification as the validity of certain
theories of the Atonement. Simpson says that this is
true of Ritschl's contention, that the community of
believers is primarily the object of justification
(op. cit. iii, 20). For the question really is whether
the church is part of the revelation of God in Ohrist
or not, and justification is still equivalent to the
lLIbid. p 619. 2Ph. 3: 10.
-_
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forgiveness of sins in either case. Whether the cross
is a satisfaction for sin, whether the work of Christ
possesses a substitutionary character, whether the sac-
ramental church is part of the Divine scheme of redemption,
are questions affecting the revelation of God in Christ
rather than the status of those who through faith become
the objects of reconciliation. The parting of the ways
in respect of justification depends on the l'lelationwhd.ch
exists between forgiveness and the infusion of holiness.
The latter is not denied by Protestants.
But it is conceived as resulting from the commun-
ication of the Spirit, which necessarily springsfrom the
Divine act of pardon and acceptance. Roman theology,
on the other hand, regards forgiveness as consequent upon
the transmission of holiness, which it calls righteousness,
the normal channas of this process being the sacrrunents.
The distinction is not merely a matter of terms, but
has an important bearing upon the Christian character.
The provision of aids, however- powerful, for the attain-
ment of justification must have an entirely different
effect upon the daily life of the believer from the
assurance of a reconciliation already fully won.
We have now given enough attention to justification
and its history and must return to the real task of sum-
marization.
CHAPTER VI
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON ARISTOTLE AND PAUL
From the foregoing study a wealth of significant
conclusions can be dravm. First, ,justicemaybe ca.lled
the disposition of the good man to distribute Goods or
Happiness, both VIithin his own personality and beyond
himself among his fellows in society, as nearly as possible
according to the ideal of equality wnong equals. This
ideal can be only approximated in varying degrees of
perfection. Therefore, simple justice is enlarged into
reward for merit and punishment for demerit distributed
as mearly as possible according to the law of justice;
.
that is, merit and demerit in quality and quantity fit-
ting to the good or the bad act. Im primitive commun-
ities the distribution was left to private vengeance,
a life for a life was the accepted conception of justice.
Later private vengeance, in more highly developed
societies, VIaS determined by statutes and admLnd a t.er-ed
by courts. With the best will in the world, judges
found themselves anable to apply laws so as always to
secure justice. Complicating and mitigating circumstances
entered into criminal transactions which made it impossible
to apply universal laws to particular cases. One dis-
ability came from the fact that law embodied and rested
60
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upon the older conception of vengeance, and the con-
templated pun Lshmerrb because the deed, or crime, was
done, no matter why it VIas done, nor how much good it
accomplished to society.
Consequently, equity was introduced to sup-
plement law. It engaged the three factors; judge, the
judged, and the process of judging. ~'he judge with good
sense of judgment replaced the law because the law was
weak :tn that it could not fit itself into the sinuosities
of human I nature and such a judge made due allowances for
such a living force. Next, the process of judging by
equity was no longer based on vengeance or soley upon
deeds done or efficient causation, but upon teleological
considerations or the purpose of the action. The judgment
in equity was the means not only by which according to
rectificatory justice a state of former equality was
restored be twe en litigants, but it is also the means
of good to the defendant and plaintiff and the state.
Therefore, it resolutely looks to the future. )~'/hen
equity becomes fully conscious of itself and its pur-
poses, it turns entirely away from the past, refuses
to inflict punisbment soley because a now unchangeable
deed was done, and orders measures that look only to
the betterment of society and the individual. In this
situation much depends upon the defendant. His present
state of mind must include a clear lmowledge of what
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is right, a proper estimate of the value of righteousness,
and a firm faith in his own ability or trust in some power
beyond himself to enable him to do the right. Part of
that power beyond himself may be the penality inflicted
upon him, and which will act in the future as an effec-
tive det er-r-errto a repetition of cr:tminal acts • Equity,
therefore, is by no means lawless, unjust, nor entirely'
free from the infliction of prophylactic measures pain-
ful or pleasurable.
This doctrine of justice and eqUity, developed
by Aristotle out of the common sense of common practice
of man kind, Paul applies to justification in religion.
From his own nation he received the conception of law
based upon the thought of vengeance. In his own exper-
ience he had found that method futile to produce peace-'-
the Jewish substitue for the Greek happiness. The law
merely enjoined acts and stated penalties for deeds, but
did not aim at the eradication of those motives which
incited men to unlawful acts. It was 1n no sense tele-
ological. Moreover, it was, like all general statutes,
inapplicable to individual cases. Consequently, Paul
turned from justice administered by the offender upon
himselfl to equity, or the grace of God that freely re-
mits penalties for past sins2 which is accepted by faith--
a state of mind which knows that Christ-likeness is the
lCor. 6: 12; Ro. 1: 25, 26, 28, 29; 2: 14; 3: 19, 23.
2
nc . 3: 24.
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sumum bonuml--loves Christ above all, and trusts him as
Savior. 2
This doctrine of justification by grace through
faith alone which permeated the Apostolic Church and be-
came the heart of the Gospel of the Gentiles, was soon
modified and by the time of Augustine transformed into
the teaching that salvation comes by a combination of the
merits of Jesus Christ earned through his suffering on
the Cross, and the merit of the offender gained by his
own penance. The transition was due to the laxity in
morals and indifference in religion which crept in upon
the unconverted Church members who substituted ceremonial
rites for Paul's faith, and who on account of formal ob-
servance, felt themselves to be safe from condemnation
in a future wo r-Ld , To overcome such laxity and indiffer-
ence the Church permitted and nurtured the teaching that
no man 'Has freely and completely justified and saved
from future retribution by faith alone, but that he must
pay in some form of deprivation or positive pain for every
sin he commits after his baptism which eradicates his
original sin and its previous guilt.
The lliLderlyingcauses of the laxity itself are
not far to seek. First, Paul's justification by grace
offered such a boon only to those who had "faith" or were
"new creatures in Christ," or, like himself, were IIconverted."
I
Ro. 4: 8. 2Ph. 3: 12; Gal. 5: 6; nc , 24: 25.
l
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Su h by a growing Church,c a high demand was soon modified
'ght of en-
and in the course of centuries it Vlas lost SJ.
t· i 1 institution,~rely. Vtlhenthe Church became an Imper a '
it leaped quicly into a position of worldy power, honor,
and t the world.'wealth by adapting its requirements 0
Th As a result,e leaven was thus smothered in the mass.
its members did not knoVl righteousness as incarnate in
J trust him actuallyesus Christ, nor love him supremely, nor
as a Savior from sinning. Therefore the Church fell bacl::
upon worldly standards, legalistic methods, and judicial
proceedings to sustain, not a Christian standard of Inor-
ality nor a steady movement to enlarge the Kingdom of
Heaven on earth, but a standard of living just high enough
to escape scandal among the heathen or in the community
of' the age, an attempt that ended eventually in failure.
Finally we conclude that justification by grace
through faith is the only doctrine that a religion be-
lieving in a God of love who is a Father of all men, in
Jesus Christ as God Incarnate, who came to save all men,
Can propose as a measure for restoring men to that rela-
tion with God which will most effectively build them up
in the likeness of Christ. For this purpose law had
demonstrated its impracticability; penalties are impossible
to equate with sin, works cannot be prescribed for each
individual which will most efficaciously operate to make
him Christ-like, and demand for penalty or punishment in
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the sense of deprivation or pain imposed upon a human
being because of his past deed over and above the natural
consequences of his act and the civil penalties imposed
upon him by society to protect itself, is irrational,
futile, and vengeful in itself and is therefore evil
because it is unjust and useless. Such an act cannot
be charged against God as rational being, full of love
for his children to whose future Good, along with the
Good of the Church he looks with unwavering purpose.
From these conclusions themselves, however,
other apparently overt and rnistaken results should not
be taken. The certainty that equity rests entirely upon
God's love for man does 'not permit anyone to assert that
therefore no pain nor deprivation is suffered by anybody
under God's will or permission. God's means of making
the Christian more Christ-like may include as much agony
as His Son endured, who was made perfect through suffering.
For "whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth." The Christian
seeking neither ease nor happiness, but perfection may
end on the cross. This follows from the fact that the
Christian is not lawless. His purpose holds him fast
with unyielding power. Means to the end are offered
him by God. From them he selects those which in his
judgment are best fitted for his purpose. But a means
once chosen, VJorks inevitably snd inexorably. Between
a means and its result the cannection is as rigid as
~--------
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between a cause and its effect. Antinomianism" lawless-
ness" caprice are all resolutely eliminated from that
justification and edification in Chl""ist,that which rests
upon grace and is received through .faith consisting o.f
an idea of the right, a supreme love for righteousness,
and a sagacious det er-md.ria'tLon to use every means available
for achieving Christ-like righteousness.
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